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ABSTRACT
Pandemic and epidemic diseases such as CoVID-19, SARS-CoV2,
and Ebola have spread to multiple countries and infected thousands
of people. Such diseases spread mainly through person-to-person
contacts. Health care authorities recommend contact tracing proce-
dures to prevent the spread to a vast population. Although several
mobile applications have been developed to trace contacts, they
typically require collection of privacy-intrusive information such
as GPS locations, and the logging of privacy-sensitive data on a
third party server, or require additional infrastructure such as WiFi
APs with known locations. In this paper, we introduce CONTAIN,
a privacy-oriented mobile contact tracing application that does not
rely on GPS or any other form of infrastructure-based location sens-
ing, nor the continuous logging of any other personally identifiable
information on a server. The goal of CONTAIN is to allow users to
determine with complete privacy if they have been within a short
distance, specifically, Bluetooth wireless range, of someone that
is infected, and potentially also when. We identify and prove the
privacy guarantees provided by our approach. Our simulation study
utilizing an empirical trace dataset (Asturies) involving 100 mobile
devices and around 60000 records shows that users can maximize
their possibility of identifying if they were near an infected user by
turning on the app during active times.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy protections; • Information
systems→Mobile information processing systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Viruses such as CoVID-19 and SARS-CoV2 have infected hundreds
of people throughout the world, resulting in multiple fatalities.
The World Health Organization has issued guidelines to limit virus
outbreak by tracking people who may have come in contact with
an infected individual [7]. Such measures allow government and
health care officials to drastically reduce the spread of the virus to
a large community. The infected individual is required to share all
his or her travel details with the health care authorities to reliably
track and quarantine people who may contract the virus due to
their physical proximity with the infected individual.
The contact tracking process typically involves gathering privacy
sensitive information from the infected individual. Privacy-savvy
individuals may not be willing to share all the information, which
may hamper the contact tracing process while exposing the vast
population to continued spread. A privacy-sensitive contact track-
ing approach would encourage the people to participate in the
contact tracing process confidently, which is the focus of this work.
Several contact tracking applications involving mobile applica-
tions, wireless technologies, and GPS have been presented in the
literature [1, 4, 5, 8–12]. Such approaches either expect the infected
individual to self-report their contact information or rely on exter-
nal infrastructures such as wireless access points and GPS. On the
one hand, the approaches requiring self-reporting are not reliable
since the individuals may not honestly report the information to
the government authorities. On the other hand, the infrastructure-
dependent methods work only when the mobile device is in the
proximity of the infrastructure; note that the GPS reception is not
reliable in indoor environments. EPIC [1] and ENACT [8] were
developed to trace contacts using a mobile application in a privacy-
preserving manner. While they avoid the use of GPS, these frame-
works rely on a wireless access point. Mobile phones report the
access point identifier and the timestamp to a server, which is then
matched against the infected user’s information to detect contact
proximity.
In this work, we present CONTAIN (an acronym coined from
“CONtact TrAcINg"), which is amobile application to enable privacy-
sensitive contact tracing for epidemics. We show how to leverage
the users’ mobile devices sending anonymous encrypted or random
messages to each other via Bluetooth to allow users to determine
with a 100% privacy if they have been in range of an infected user
in the past, and when. There is no collection of privacy sensitive
GPS, no reliance on external infrastructure for location tracking,
no continuous logging of personally identifiable information from
users. Specifically we introduce two privacy-friendly contact trac-
ing protocols for CONTAIN; The first protocol uses symmetric key
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encryption, while the second protocol requires the secure genera-
tion of sufficiently large random numbers. In a way, they are duals
of each other: the first protocol nodes upload the messages they
have heard, while in the second protocol, the nodes upload the
messages they have sent. Both protocols provide privacy for users
that are not infected as such users never need to reveal their iden-
tity or contacts. Both protocols offer users with opt-in measures to
get verified and declare if they are infected, while still maintain-
ing some measure of privacy for the general public as they do not
need to reveal their true identities or those of their contacts or the
locations they have visited to everyone. And both protocols allow
users to privately detect if they have had contacts with others that
are infected.
2 RELATEDWORK
During the EBOLA outbreak in 2014, theWorld Health Organization
(WHO) explained the importance of contact tracing and laid down
protocols for tracing contacts [7]. But, WHO did not employ any
mobile application, and they have only provided guidelines for
the health care workers to improve the efficiency of the contact
tracing process. A number of mobile phone based contact tracing
applications have been presented in the literature [1, 4, 5, 8–12].
Danquah et al. [4] presents an electronic system for contact
tracing to address the shortcomings of paper-based contact trac-
ing efforts in Port Loko District, Sierra Leone. An Ebola Contact
Tracing application called ECT app was developed to manage the
communication between contact tracing coordinators and contact
tracers. Our proposal focuses on tracking individuals whomay have
come in contact with an infected patient. We could extend our end
application to enable support for coordination and cooperation.
The importance and effectiveness of epidemic contact tracing
via communication traces are discussed in [5]. A contact tracing
data set was used to show when to initiate the tracing and explains
how the choice between tracing of random people from the popu-
lation and the infected people influences the effectiveness of the
contract tracing process. But, Farrahi et al. [5] does not present
any mechanisms to collect contract tracing data from the users in
a privacy-preserving fashion.
Shahabi et al. [11] presents a framework called PLACE in a vi-
sion paper to trace the proximity of individuals based on location
data. [11] discussed the importance of processing the information
in a privacy-preserving manner, but it did not present a specific
solution. Our proposal focuses on tracing contact using obfuscated
Bluetooth beacons without relying on GPS as a primary source.
Besides, GPS-based approaches do not provide reliable results in
an indoor environment.
EPIC [1] and ENACT [8] are developed to trace contacts using
a mobile application in a privacy-preserving manner. Both these
frameworks rely on a wireless access point, wherein the mobile
phones are expected to report the access point identifier and the
timestamp to a server, which is then matched against the infected
user’s information to detect contact proximity. Such an approach
would only work on locations with wireless access points. Our
proposal aims to trace contact with mobile phones alone.
Qathrady et al. [9] presents an infection tracing framework for
hospitals based on a centralized server. This scheme relies on static
Figure 1: Components of the CONTAIN Application.
infrastructures deployed in the hospital environment, and it does
not address privacy explicitly. Our proposal focuses on a location-
agnostic mobile-based application.
Reddy et al. [10] presents a dengue-monitoring application, which
helps the population to report dengue to the health authorities along
with their location information. Besides, it includes a symptoms
checker to help the users. This application relies on the information
provided by the users, and it does not record communication traces.
Our proposed application aims to record physical contacts using
Bluetooth technology.
Yoneki et al. [12] presents EpiMap to create a map of infected
people and their contacts using a mobile application called Flu-
Phone, which collects Bluetooth proximity data and GPS location
to trace connections in the case of infection. But, FluPhone does not
present any privacy-preserving mechanisms. Our proposal aims to
develop a mobile application that collects traces without violating
the privacy of the users.
In summary, all the existing solutions either rely on wireless
access points or lack support for tracing contacts in a privacy-
preserving, opt-in fashion.
3 CONTAIN: PRIVACY-ORIENTED CONTACT
TRACING PROTOCOLS
3.1 Design Goals
The design goals of the CONTAIN framework are described in this
section.
• The application should not rely on external infrastructure
such as WiFi access points with known locations or the use
of GPS for determining contact information as it may violate
the location privacy of the user.
• The application should not disclose any personally identifi-
able information to other mobile devices.
• A user should be able to check if they have been near an
infected user on their own, in a completely private manner,
without being forced to reveal to anyone else their infection
status.
• The anonymized information needed for other users to deter-
mine if they have been in contact with a user that is infected
should be made available to the public through a trusted
server only if the user can prove to the operator of the server
(e.g. through a medical certificate) that he or she is infected.
3.2 System description
Figure 1 shows the components of the CONTAIN framework.
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Figure 2: Illustration of how the Privacy-Sensitive Contact
Tracing App would work with our first protocol.
• Mobile Device Mobile devices (smartphones) have become
prominent in the last decade. Almost every individual is
carrying a highly capable mobile device (smartphone). The
core processes of the CONTAIN application run on user’s
smartphones. We describe below two different protocols
that can be used for the CONTAIN application, one based on
encrypted beacons (see Section 3.3) and one based on random
beacons (see Section 3.4). The CONTAIN application does
not rely on or require GPS (in a given implementation of it,
it may be possible to additionally allow users to reveal GPS
information to the application on an opt-in basis, but this is
not an essential part or requirement of our design).
• Bluetooth technology Bluetooth is one of the widely used
communication technology in contemporary smartphones.
Today, this technology is used for short-range communi-
cation with hands-free earphones and external Bluetooth-
based devices such as speakers and other audio systems. The
communication range of Bluetooth is on the order of 10
meters or less [3].
• Verification server The smartphone and the Bluetooth
technology can be used to gather contact traces in a pri-
vate manner, which is discussed in Section 3.3 and 3.4. A
third-party server is required to verify the infection status of
a user (than claims to be infected) and then to make anony-
mous information from that infected user available for other
users to use, in a private manner, to verify if they have been
near the infected user.
The CONTAIN application requires Bluetooth technology in
combination with computation resources and ability to access the
verification server over the Internet (through any means such as
Cellular or WiFi). Note that the contact tracing logic on the phone
transmits and receives an anonymous encrypted or random Blue-
tooth beacon from other mobile devices running the CONTAIN
application.
3.3 Protocol 1: Encrypted Beacons
Figure 2 shows the illustration of the first contact tracing protocol.
Figure 3: Illustration of how the Privacy-Sensitive Contact
Tracing App would work with our second protocol.
(1) Each user periodically beacons, using Bluetooth, a message,
M, consisting of a unique name or ID, a time-stamp, and a
random number (salt) that changes over time. Each message
is encrypted using a symmetric key enc(M). Note that the
users do not share this key with others.
(2) Other users that hear the encrypted message beacon log it
locally.
(3) Either periodically or in a batch, on an opt-in basis, each
user can upload all the encrypted beacon messages they have
heard to a common verification server.
(4) If a user i becomes infected, they inform the server, on an
opt-in basis, with evidence that they are infected, such as a
medical report or “infection certificate". The above step of
uploading encrypted beacon messages could also be taken
in conjunction with this step.
(5) The verification server proceeds to make all the messages up-
loaded by user i publicly available, but still in the encrypted
form.
(6) Each other user j can privately check these now publicly
available encrypted messages to see if they can decrypt any
of them. Note that this verification process could be auto-
mated. If any user manages to decrypt the message, then he
or she is at risk as he or she has been near an infected per-
son. In this case, the user should then proceed to get tested
themselves.
3.4 Protocol 2: Random Beacons
Figure 3 shows the illustration of the second contact tracing proto-
col.
(1) Each user beacons a sufficiently large random number and
logs this random number locally. Here, a large number is
chosen to minimize the chance of collisions with beacons
generated by other users.
(2) Others that hear the beacon log this number locally.
(3) Either periodically or in a batch, on an opt-in basis, each
user can upload all the random beacon messages they have
transmitted to a common verification server.
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(4) If a user i becomes infected, on an opt-in basis, they inform
the verification server with evidence that they are infected,
such as a medical report or “infection certificateâĂİ. The
above step of uploading the random beacon messages could
also be done in conjunction with this step.
(5) The verification server then proceeds to make all the random
numbers uploaded by this user publicly available.
(6) Other users periodically check the server and see if any of
the numbers they have logged locally match those that were
revealed by an infected user; if so they should proceed to get
tested.
The fourth step in both protocols requires a trusted third party
that a) operates the “publicizingâĂİ server, and b) can verify through
a medical certificate that the user whose uploaded anonymous data
is being made public has truly tested positive for being infected.
This party must be trusted and perform the verification correctly
to minimize false alarms. It may be necessary for this role to be
fulfilled by an organization (whether public or private) with relevant
experience and reputation. For example, it could be a healthcare
organization or government entity, or medical insurance provider.
Both protocols require the ability to beacon information over
short range Bluetooth links. TodayâĂŹs mobile phones, for security,
privacy and energy efficiency reasons, generally require applica-
tions that do such beaconing to run in the foreground; regrettably,
this could make the protocols less effective than they could be. But
perhaps mobile device manufacturers could be prevailed upon to
provide greater access to such an app in the public interest. Alterna-
tively, at least at relatively more crowded venues such as airports,
campuses, shopping areas or public transportation, users can be
encouraged to download and turn on these apps.
3.5 Anonymizing an Infected User
Note that the information revealed by the verification server does
not explicitly contain anything that would reveal to others who
the infected user is; it only allows other users to determine if they
have been near an infected user and when. In some cases, if a user
knows that during a certain time they were only in contact with
(within bluetooth range) of a specific person they know, they may
be able to infer the identity of the infected person from the time
information provided. One way the infected user could potentially
avoid even this minimal chance of disclosure would be to only
release information from times when they know they were in the
presence of many other devices (which could be determined based
on the timestamps of logged messages), and of course they could
also opt-out of notifying other parts.
While it may be assumed the infected user must make themselves
known to the owner/operator of the verification server since they
must provide the medical certificate that they are infected, there is
an additional step that could be taken to anonymize them further.
This would involve asking the infected user to use a public-key pair
that does not tie them to a real-world identity, and have the medical
authority digitally sign an infection certificate (using their own key
pair) that only includes the infected user’s public key. The infected
user can then provide this digital certificate to the verification
server. From this point on the verification server can verify using
the public key of the medical authority that the anonymous user
contacting it (whom they know only through its public key) is
indeed infected, and the verification server can thus ensure that
only the (anonymous) data uploaded by a user that is truly infected
is being made publicly available.
3.6 Anonymizing Encounter Time
We would like to clarify one additional aspect that is *not* guar-
anteed to be kept private by either protocol. If an infected user i
has opted-in to notify the verification server and share the data
it logged, then any user j that has actually been near the user i
will know the time of encounter, which will a) de-anonymize the
location of the encounter (since the user may remember where
they were at that encounter time; or a fortiori in protocol 1 they
could also inject their own GPS location explicitly into the message
that is encrypted to keep track of where they were during each
encounter), and b) de-anonymize the identify of the infected user
i to j (if user j knows and remembers or has some other way of
identifying who they were near at the time of encounter).
Fortunately, there is a solution to this problem. If it is desired
to further strengthen the system to provide for an additional layer
of privacy to avoid the above shortcoming, one possible solution
would be to use protocol 2 (random beacons) and eliminate the
public notification step so that the verification server does *not*
publish all the random numbers sent by the infected user. Instead,
require the user interested in checking if they were near an infected
user to upload all the random numbers they have logged along with
an anonymizing "ID" to the server (using TOR or something similar
to ensure an anonymous upload). Then the server will verify if there
is any overlap between the random numbers from the infected user
and random numbers uploaded the user that is checking. If so, it
publishes only a notification that the user corresponding to that
anonymous ID has been (or not been) in contact with an infected
user.
4 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In this section we formally identify and prove the privacy guaran-
tees we can provide. The properties and their proofs assume that
the trusted verification server behaves correctly in all cases.
We first list the key privacy properties that both our protocols
guarantee below:
• P1. Beacons emitted by a user do not reveal any personally
identifying information or location information about that
user to other users.
• P2. Users that are not infected are not required to upload
any information to the verification server.
• P3. Users will not be notified by the verification server about
or receive any data from the verification server that can help
them verify potential contact with users that are not infected
• P4. Users that are infected must opt-in in order for other
users to determine if they have been near that infected user.
• P5. Users can check if they have been near an (opted-in)
infected user without revealing any personally identifiable
information about themselves.
Further, there are two additional privacy properties that can be
shown to hold with the appropriate additional modifications as
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discussed in section 3.5 (for both protocols) and section 3.6 (for
protocol 2 only):
• P6. Users that are infected can keep themselves anonymous
even from the operator of the verification server.
• P7. A user that finds out it has been contact with an infected
user will not be able to determine when or where exactly
the contact happened.
Proof of P1:We assume that the underlying Bluetooth protocol
itself is making user of ephemeral, time-varying ID’s and not send-
ing static, identifiable MAC addresses (such schemes are already
implemented by privacy-sensitive mobile device operating systems
such as Apple’s iOS [6]). In protocol 1, the beacons are encrypted
using a symmetric key that is not revealed to any other user. The
use of a salt that can be changed each time further makes it so
that there is no way to connect a particular individual or device
with the logged data since it will be different each time the salt
is changed. In protocol 2, the beacons consist of random numbers
that can also change each time, so again, there is no identifying
information being transmitted. Neither protocol requires collection
of any location information. In protocol 1, the user could chose to
encrypt their own GPS data if they so wish, but this information
could only be checked by them on their own since it is encrypted
with a key that only they possess.
Proof of P2: This property is a direct consequence of the two
protocols. At no step is a device required to upload any information
if they are not infected. Although step 3 in each protocol does allow
each user to upload their random logged info periodically, they are
not required to do so before they are infected, and even then it is
on an opt-in basis.
Proof of P3: Since users that are not infected do not upload any
information to the verification server in either protocol, there is no
way for other users to be notified about or learn anything about
them.
Proof of P4: For other users to determine if they have been near
an infected user, the verification server needs to make available
logs from that infected user. However, in both protocols, the logs
are provided by infected users only on an opt-in basis.
Proof of P5: For both protocols, the verification server can
make the anonymous information they get from the infected users
available on a public website. Users can use an anonymous web
browser such as TOR to download that information and check if
they have been near any of the infected user in a completely private
manner, without revealing any of their identifying information to
the operator of the verification server or any other party.
Proof of P6: To allow infected users to keep themselves anony-
mous from the verification, the certificate from the medical au-
thority should include only the public key of the infected user, as
described in the additional step of section 3.5. If that additional
measure is taken, then the infected users gain an additional level
of anonymity and privacy.
Proof of P7: This is addressed by the solution presented in
Section 3.6. By restricting to protocol 2 and asking users that want
to check if they are infected to anonymously provide their logged
data to the verification server, it can be ensured that the users that
are checking will be notified that there was an encounter but not
when or where the encounter happened.
5 EVALUATION
Most mobile operating systems today require apps that use Blue-
tooth communication to run in the foreground. Thus it requires
active user intervention to be useful. In this section we evaluate
through trace-based simulations how well CONTAIN would work
as a function of how long the app is turned on by the user each day,
and when it is turned on. We use a dataset named Asturies provided
by CRAWDAD.org for our simulation [2]. The dataset contains the
encounter of mobile devices with each other at different times-
tamps. We split the day time into 24 slots and mapped one hour of
the dataset to each time slot. Users are considered to turn on the
CONTAIN mobile app to participate in the experiment according
to three different scenarios, which are described in Section 5.1.
During the experiments, we varied both the number of initial
infected users that are chosen randomly and also the probability
that the disease gets transferred between people to see their effects
on the results. Moreover, we considered several time slots that users
turn on their Bluetooth-based CONTAIN app to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of our protocols in different scenarios. Each experiment is
repeated 1000 times to capture the randomness of the simulations.
5.1 Methodology
We conducted two sets of experiments. First we designed an experi-
ment to study how the infection rate grows among people according
to the initial number of infected users and the contagiousness prob-
ability.
Second, we designed an experiment with three different scenar-
ios in terms of when users schedule the time slots that they turn
on their Bluetooth-based CONTAIN app.
• Random: In this scenario, users turn on their Bluetooth
randomly in 12 contiguous hours that correspond to the
most active time of the day.
• Decentralized: In this scenario, each user turns on his or
her Bluetooth and runs the CONTAIN app when they are
in a crowded place such as train stations, offices, shopping
malls, etc. in a decentralized manner. For this scenario, we
sort the time slots for each user according to the number
of devices that the user connected to in that time slot. The
second criterion for sorting is the crowdedness of the area
that the user is. We measure the crowd level of an area by
counting the number of records that we have in each time
slot. Then, during an experiment where the user turns on
for k slots, it does so for the first k slots in the sorted order.
• Centralized: In this scenario, we assume that there is some
centralized coordination mechanism that ensures that all
users turn on their Bluetooth and run the CONTAIN app
at specific hours of the day. In this scenario, we sort the
time slots according to first the average number of active
mobile devices, and second the number of records that we
have in each hour in the dataset. Thus the app is activated
by everyone during the hours with the most active mobile
devices.
5.2 Results
Figure 4 shows the results from our first set of experiments, show-
ing the number of users who get infected by infectious diseases
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Figure 4: Number of Infected Users vs Contagiousness Prob-
ability and Initially Infected Users
Figure 5: Number of Test Required Users vs Number of Ac-
tive Bluetooth Hours
such as CoVID-19 and SARS-CoV2 with 90% confidence interval
versus contagiousness probability. These are also the number of
initial users who are assumed to be infected at the beginning of the
simulation. As you can see, as we have more number of initially
infected users and also higher contagiousness probability, more
people get infected.
Figure 5 represents the number of users who have been in contact
with or in the proximity of infected persons. In this experiment,
we assumed the contagiousness probability is 2%, and the initial
number of infected users is 2. From Figure 5, it is clear that as more
people cooperate and turn on their Bluetooth for more number
of time slots, more number of potentially infected users could be
identified reliably.
As we can see in Figure 4, when the number of infected peo-
ple grows so fast, it is essential to identify and notify potentially
infected people to get tested. Besides, this helps the individuals
who may have come in contact with the infected individual to take
corrective actions, including self-isolation, to prevent him or her
from spreading the infection to others.
In this experiment, we have, on average, 100 devices active per
week and around 60000 records for those devices per week, which
indicates a dense environment with lots of interactions among
people. That is why such a small contagiousness probability and also
initially infected people results in a considerable number of infected
users. Consequently, as we can see in Figure 5, our application
informs many more people in case more number of them actively
use the Bluetooth-based CONTAIN application. In this way, people
can be alerted to get tested, take care of themselves and not spread
the virus among other people by restricting their activities and
avoiding crowded areas.
It is also interesting and important to note that when people act
in a decentralized manner and turn on their Bluetooth-based app
only when they go to a crowded environment, we will also have
better performance as compared to the centralized and random
scenarios. It is also interesting to see that decentralized scenario
results in more number of people being detected as potentially
infected and required to do the test as compared to the centralized
scenario. This is because, if each person turns his or her Bluetooth
in the places where lots of other people are available (this is evident
from the dataset that we used in our study), much more number
of encounters will be recorded as compared to the centralized rule,
which does not fit everyone’s activity.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented CONTAIN, which is a privacy-
friendly and Bluetooth-based mobile application for contact tracing.
Unlike the existing contact tracing application, the proposed contact
tracing protocols have shown to be infrastructure independent.
We have presented two contact tracing protocols, both of which
do not reveal any personally identifiable information. Through
a simulation study, we have shown how the contact tracing can
effectively mitigate the spread of infectious diseases.
We plan to investigate how privacy-oriented approaches influ-
ence adoption in our future work. Besides, we will also develop
methods to overcome system challenges that prevent Android and
iOS users from running Bluetooth-based applications in the back-
ground. And, the existing contract tracing projects do not provide
any open-source software for experimentation purposes, with the
exception of FluPhone [12]. We plan to develop and release open-
source software implementations of CONTAIN for both Android
and iOS devices, and perform a real world pilot study in the future.
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